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Abstract 
 
This study aims to analyze how the secondment of public servants has affected the 
development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). I will look at how these 
officials influence, and are influenced by, EU decision-making processes; how their 
baggage of knowledge and assumptions change with their secondment; and how they, in 
turn, transform decision-making processes in their respective institutions. It is hypothesized 
that these networks, through processes of mutual learning and socialization, contribute to 
the Europeanization of national foreign policies, on the one hand, and to the development 
of common assumptions, approaches and values in foreign policy, on the other. 
 
Basing myself on academic discussions of socialization in international institutions 
and in the Union in particular, I shall look at how these patterns of socialization translate 
into the development of a common set of assumptions and approaches.  A series of 
interviews will give flesh and depth to the theoretical findings.   2
Introduction 
As the European Union (EU) has seen its capacities for external action grow tremendously, 
policy-makers and academics started thinking about the EU’s international identity.  On the 
diplomatic side, the Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) has enabled the EU to act 
as a unified actor on the international scene.  Operationally, the creation of a European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) gave the Union the instruments necessary to back up its 
political dialogue with coercive means.  Over the past 15 years, the Union’s foreign policy 
machinery grew, became more institutionalized, and developed important operational 
capacities as well as experience. And yet, while the research community has studied these 
institutional evolutions, and their consequences, widely and extensively, a few elements of 
analysis have been missing, and this paper modestly attempts to answer some of these 
lacunae. In this context, the question arose, if this new policy environment was perhaps 
capable, by coordinating national foreign policies, and more and more, establish novel 
approaches and rules of behaviours, of slowly changing the way governments and public 
opinions shape their countries’ foreign policies.   
 
Within this research agenda, a question that has not often been asked is what the 
impact of individual policy-makers is.  There is a strong American tradition of analyzing 
foreign policy in bureaucratic and organizational terms
1.  And while some recent European 
research has taken an institutional look at the new policy environment
2, the role of 
individuals, as shapers of policy has been overlooked in studies of CFSP and ESDP. 
 
With this framework in mind, the question I endeavour to answer in this paper is how 
do seconded national experts (SNEs) impact the making of European foreign policy, and 
whether or not this impact has a meaning for a convergence of national foreign policies 
towards a form of European “ideal”.  It is hypothesized that SNEs, who come to Brussels 
socialized within their countries’ own cultural and historical baggage, can, through certain 
social and learning mechanisms, constrain both European and national foreign policy-making 
                                                 
1 See Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, New 
Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1999, and Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS and NSC, 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999. 
2 See for example Simon Duke and Sophie Vanhoonacker, “Administrative Governance in the CFSP: 
Development and Practice,” European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 11, n. 2 (April 2006), pp. 163-82; Ana 
Juncos and Christopher Reynolds, “The Political and Security Committee: Governing in the Shadows,” 
European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 12, n. 2 (April 2007); pp. 127-147; and Hylke Dijkstra, “The Council 
Secretariat’s Role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy,” European Foreign Affairs Review, vol 13, n. 2 
(May 2008), pp.149-166.   3
into acting in ways that are mutually acceptable.  If these processes continue over time, this 
may signal a convergence, or Europeanization, of foreign policy, both in its actions, its 
instruments, but also in the norms and values they seek to promote. 
 
  Firstly, I will take a closer look at Europeanization theory, which claims that national 
policies are influenced by European policy-making, which constrains them and slowly makes 
them more similar.  Such analyses have only recently been used in the context of foreign 
policy, and will be looked at as well.  I will also analyze one of the mechanisms of 
Europeanization, socialization.  Here, individuals may change in their habits of thought and 
behaviour simply by joining a new group, or a new institutional setting. 
  Secondly, some data gathered from interviews with SNEs working in the European 
institutions will be analyzed.  I look at SNEs because they are an archetypal case: national 
civil servants, and therefore deeply socialized into national habits of policy-making, but who, 
for the time of their secondment, are fully independent of their home employer and are totally 
loyal to their new institution.  As we shall see, they have developed certain mechanisms to 
cope with this ambiguous position, mechanisms that, if used properly, can trigger changes 
both in European and national foreign policy apparatuses. 
 
Processes of Europeanization and socialization in foreign policy 
Seen by some as existing mid-way between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism
3, the 
theory of Europeanization posits that EU membership will affect national political and policy 
processes, by constraining the range of possible and acceptable actions.  While the 
Europeanization approach has been widely used in most fields of European Community (EC) 
competence
4, its use in the analysis of European foreign policy and its effects on national 
foreign policies has been less studied.  This is mostly due to the fact that, if cooperation in 
these matters dates back to the 1970s and European Political Cooperation (EPC), its lack of 
formalization and institutionalization weren’t seen as conducive to such processes of 
Europeanization.  However, with the advent of CFSP, and the further institutionalization and 
operationalization of ESDP, academics started wondering if the development of a European 
foreign policy was conducive to changes in national foreign policies.  The first part of this 
section will look at what this means. 
                                                 
3 Reuben Wong, The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy – France and the EU in East Asia, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave, 2006. 
4 For a recent look at the state of the art, see Paolo Graziano and Maarten Vink (eds.), Europeanization – New 
Research Agendas, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2007.   4
  One of the key mechanisms of Europeanization is socialization.   Defined by Jeffrey 
Checkel as the “process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community,”
5 
it is oriented towards analyzing changes in beliefs, values and actions within individual actors 
who enter a new institutional setting.  In this sense, it is an important mechanism if we are to 
analyze the work of Seconded National Experts (SNEs), national policy-makers who exist 
with pre-existing norm- and action-expectations, and penetrate a new social environment.  In 
this section, we will therefore look, in the second part, at the theoretical mechanisms leading 
to socialization. 
 
Europeanization of national foreign policies 
Historically, the notion of foreign policy is state-centred, since only those political entities 
with clear, discernible national interests could use policy tools to influence world politics.  If 
we take this notion of interest as the key element, then we must conclude that the EU is not a 
unified actor with an identifiable interest
6.  And yet, it is difficult to analyze European Union 
foreign policy (EUFP) as strictly intergovernmental: as Michael E. Smith points out, national 
preferences and interests, as spelled out at the European level, are not formed independently 
of others and a priori
7.  Even more so in the CFSP, Europeanization is a midway between 
supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, since member states adapt to CFSP structures 
and norms, but contribute (heavily) to their creation
8.  In other words, its “complex 
administrative governance” means that CFSP decisions go beyond the lowest common 
denominator
9.  Indeed, Smith sees what he calls a “problem-solving approach” to EUFP, 
through appeals to common values rather than interests
10. 
In this sense, national foreign policies are more and more seen as the result of a series 
of negotiations between governments, institutions and personnel, and policy learning
11.  
Paraphrasing Tonra, Wong defines foreign policy Europeanization as a “transformation in the 
way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional 
                                                 
5 Jeffrey Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework”, 
International Organization, vol. 59, n. 4 (Fall 2005), p. 804. 
6 Wong, op. cit., p. 2. 
7 Michael E. Smith, “Toward a Theory of EU Foreign Policy-Making: Multi-Level Governance, Domestic 
Politics, and National Adaptation to Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy”, Journal of European 
Public Policy, vol. 11, n. 4 (August 2004), p. 741. 
8 Reuben Wong, “Foreign Policy”, in Paolo Graziano and Maarten Vink (eds.), op. cit., p. 322. 
9 Duke and Vanhoonacker, “Administrative Governance in the CFSP,”, p. 181. 
10 Michael E. Smith, op. cit., p. 741. 
11 Wong, The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy, p. 17.   5
roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalisation of norms and expectations 
arising from a complex system of collective policy-making.”
12 
 
In his book on the Europeanization of French foreign policy, Wong identifies three 
approaches to the process.  Amongst these, “identity reconstruction” (“crossloading”
13) is 
how Wong terms sociological institutionalism, and it denotes the development of new 
conceptions of interests and identity.  According to this approach, CFSP institutions have 
socialization effects: elites internalize supranational norms and interests and feed them back 
to national administrations
14.  Possible signs would include the development of common 
norms among policy-making elites, or even shared definition of EU and national interests
15.  
This will be the topic of the second part of this section. 
 
  If we follow Wong down this path, two problems arise as to research methodology.  
Firstly, how does one define causality in Europeanization?  Indeed, inasmuch as the 
mechanism is supposed to be a two-way process, the relation between dependent and 
independent variables blur: to get back to the supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy, 
while the end-result of Europeanization is a European Union foreign policy, this will be 
conceived at the national level
16.  The second methodological issue regards identifying and 
measuring such foreign policy change.  According to the author, “Studies on foreign policy 
Europeanization have … tended to rely heavily on interviews with national officials and 
Commission in Brussels … for evidence.  But can these officials seriously be expected to tell 
the researcher that they do not subscribe to the ideals of a coordinated, coherent CFSP?”
17   
 
Institutional socialization mechanisms in CFSP/ESDP 
Studies of socialization start off with a basic assumption: “Actors who enter into a social 
interaction rarely emerge the same.”
18  We can consider international institutions, at the 
individual level, as such social interactions or environments.  Within the research, one strand 
considers international institutions as promoters of socialization, while another sees them as 
sites of socialization, in other words, “insulated setting[s] where social pressure is absent or 
                                                 
12 Wong, “Foreign Policy”, p. 323. 
13 Wong, “Foreign Policy”, p. 325. 
14 Wong, The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy, p. 10. 
15 Ibid., p. 16. 
16 Wong, “Foreign Policy”, p. 330. 
17 Ibid., p. 330. 
18 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments”, International Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 45, n. 4 (December 2001), p. 488.   6
deflected” and agents “adopt multiple roles”
 19.  Whatever approach one adopts, it is 
nonetheless a fact that, as Christoph Meyer says: “close proximity and high frequency of 
interactions induce individuals to mutually adapt their perceptions and attitudes in order to 
minimize cognitive dissonance.”
20  So the question we want to ask in this context is when do 
these institutions create new senses of “togetherness”, and what do these processes mean “for 
individual and state allegiances, interests, and identities?”
21 
 
  Within CFSP, academics have analyzed, since the inception of European political 
cooperation (EPC) a so-called “coordination reflex” defined by Simon Nuttall as the 
“automatic reflex of consultation brought about by frequent personal contacts with opposite 
numbers from the other member states.”
22  This leads to the appearance of a new logic of 
appropriateness, meaning that agents think more in terms of what is appropriate in the 
specific setting instead of what is expected of them and others, called the logic of 
consequence
23. 
 
Jeffrey Checkel identifies three mechanisms of socialization, each of which may play 
a role when one looks at the structures of CFSP.   
Strategic calculation works through social and material, positive or negative 
incentives. Here, agents adapt to the rules to pursue their own given interests
24.  Hence, 
Juncos and Pomorska show that in CFSP Council working groups (CWGs), strategic 
socialization takes place, because CWG members must guarantee their reputation and 
legitimacy (by “playing the game”) in the short- and medium terms, to keep negotiation 
leverage for their governments’ long term interest
25.  On its own, however, strategic 
calculation does not lead to internalization, since here, socialization is only a tool of 
instrumental rationality; nonetheless, if compliance to norms is sustained over time, Checkel 
believes that individual preferences may change
26.  Such factors as the insulated setting of 
                                                 
19 Checkel, op. cit., pp. 806-7. 
20 Christoph Meyer, The Quest for a European Strategic Culture – Changing Norms on Security and Defence in 
the European Union, Houndmills, Palgrave, 2006,, p. 37. 
21 Checkel, op. cit., p. 802. 
22 Quoted in Ana Juncos and Christopher Reynolds, “The Political and Security Committee: Governing in the 
Shadows”, European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 12, n. 2 (April 2007), p. 132. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Checkel, op. cit., pp. 808-9. 
25 Ana Juncos and Karolina Pomorska, “Playing the Brussels Game: Strategic Socialization in the CFSP Council 
Working Groups”, European Integration Online Papers, vol. 10-11 (2006).  Available at 
<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2006-011a.htm>. 
26 Checkel, op. cit., pp. 808-9.   7
certain CWGs, the complexity of issues, the frequency of rotation, or the autonomy given to 
the agent may increase the potential for internalization
27. 
 
Secondly, groups or institutional settings may provide “simplifying shortcuts” in 
situations where resources and attention are scarce, and rationality is bounded
28. In this case, 
agents adapt in an automatic or unconscious fashion to their environment: Checkel calls this 
role playing
29. Role playing works in small groups, where contacts happen over a sustained 
period, and depends on the agents’ previous exposure to such groups or tolerance for new 
settings
30. 
If one looks at the literature, it would seem that role playing would be the type of 
mechanism at play when analysing the role of civil servants (whether national or European) in 
the development of an EU foreign policy approach.  First of all, the need for rotation (through 
Directorates at the European level, through postings at the national diplomatic level) prevents 
deep self-reflection l
31.  However, it is a fact that, as Duke and Vanhoonacker point out, CFSP 
institutions create “new rules and practices … which create new opportunities as well as 
constraints for the actors involved.”
32  In their article, they take an “administrative governance 
approach”, defined as the “contribution and impact of non-elected officials” on the policy 
process
33.  According to them, “at the decision-shaping level, the exchange between the 
national and Brussels actors is critical in both the processes of injecting and transforming 
national interests into the European context and, correspondingly, to gradually Europeanize 
foreign policies and foreign policy-making in the national context.”
34   However, while 
“diplomatic intersubjectivity” creates, according to some, a common code of CFSP conduct
35, 
the same authors argue that the further legalization and bureaucratisation of CFSP/ESDP will 
come at the expense of informality and socializing opportunities
36.  Those fears are not shared 
here, inasmuch as the legalization of ESDP is still in its infancy and that, therefore, member 
states keep a close eye on developments in this regard.  Nonetheless, it will be interesting to 
see how policies on secondment of national experts can be devised to better take account of 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., p. 810. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Meyer, op. cit., p. 126. 
32 Duke and Vanhoonacker, op. cit., p. 164. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 177. 
35 Juncos and Pomorska, op. cit. 
36 Juncos and Reynolds, op. cit., p. 143.   8
this.  While rotation is definitely an obstacle to deep internalization, it is nonetheless possible 
that the practices learned in the new setting will propagate once the rotation is done: Juncos 
and Pomorska do point out that national civil servants in CWGs are twice embedded (in 
national and European environments), and that, as they learn new practices and norms, 
“diplomats sometimes act as ‘change agents’ in relation to their own national administration”
 
37.  Their influence may even be stronger after these people return to their capitals (a normal 
diplomatic rotation does indeed alternate work abroad and in the Ministry), what the authors 
call the “contagion effect”
38.  While the article does analyze the work of national diplomats 
working in permanent representations, the situation would seem to be the same for SNEs, 
especially since, for the time of their secondment, all working links to the national 
government are technically cut.  Nonetheless, we should not forget that it will always be 
difficult to trace the dual dynamics of, on the one hand, pressures from capitals (the former in-
groups), and on the other, the task of gaining comfort and legitimacy, for the long term, in the 
current environment
39. 
 
Finally, the deepest type of socialization mechanism is what Jeffrey Checkel calls 
normative suasion: here, agents “play games" of argumentation, persuasion and convincing, 
leading them to reflect on their own beliefs and preferences, and eventually redefining them
40.  
Active and reflective internalization takes place: individuals in this situation would say that 
they act in manner X because “this is the right thing to do.”
41  In this case, the “scope 
conditions” are the newness and uncertainty of the environment, which favours curiosity and 
openness to new ideas; few pre-existing beliefs opposing the new environment; the authority 
of the persuader; the fact that work functions through deliberation, not order-giving; and if the 
environment is a less politicized and more insulated setting
42. 
However, it should be said that some of the scholarship, drawing on extensive data, 
points to the fact that this sort of intense socialization process cannot take place at the 
European level.  In her study of European Commission civil servants, Liesbet Hooghe claims 
that support for international (or EU) norms exists, not because Eurocrats are socialized into 
the European institutional setting, but rather, because “national experiences motivate them to 
                                                 
37 Juncos and Pomorska, op. cit. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Meyer, op. cit., p. 118. 
40 Checkel, op. cit., p. 812. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Checkel, op. cit., p. 813.   9
do so”, either through national support for supranationalism, or because “rational” cost-
benefit analysis makes it worth it
43.  
 
A final way of analyzing socialization processes at the European level is to look at the 
work of national civil servants, and SNEs in particular, as a way to “focus on avenues where 
both national and supranational actors participate and interact.”
44  In EU settings, national 
civil servants may play three different roles: national government representatives, sectoral 
experts, or supranational actors working for the EU.  There is therefore a triple balance to be 
played, between political loyalty, professional autonomy and supranational allegiances, 
respectively
45.  In the case of SNEs, all idea of direct government representation is by 
definition not applicable: however, the concept of “ambiguous representation” defined by 
Trondal and Veggeland is an interesting one here: in this case, “the representative has 
multiple obligations, institutional affiliations and allegiances.”
46  The idea is appealing 
because the authors’ hypothesis is that the supranational and expert roles will only 
supplement, never replace, national roles, since national civil servants are institutionalized (or 
socialized) that a national role conception is difficult to redefine
47. 
 
The Role of SNEs in European foreign policy processes 
As previously mentioned, SNEs are at the nexus of national and European decision-making, 
but at the same time, their regulatory statute means that they are fully independent of their 
government during the time of their rotation; in other words, their allegiance in Brussels is 
wholly to the institution they are seconded to.  This makes them particularly interesting 
subjects in the design of the European Union in general, and in the newly institutionalized 
field of CFSP in particular.  My discussions with SNEs show that they present certain traits as 
possible feedback “conduits” between Brussels and their capitals, on three levels: as lobbyists 
for European instruments or specific regional or functional approaches during their 
secondment; as national insiders able to explain their governments’ “red lines” to their 
Brussels hierarchy; and as advocates for a general European approach on foreign policy, after 
their return in their home bureaucracy. 
                                                 
43 Liesbet Hogghe, “Several Roads Lead to International Norms, but Few Via International Socialization: A Case 
Study of the European Commission”, International Organization, vol. 59, n. 4 (Fall 2005), p. 862. 
44 Jarle Trondal and Frode Veggeland, “Access, Voice and Loyalty: The Representation of Domestic Civil 
Servants in EU Committiees”, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 10, n. 1 (February 2003), p. 59. 
45 Jarle Trondal, “Governing at the Frontier of the European Commission: The Case of Seconded National 
Officials,” West European Politics, vol. 29, n. 1 (January 2006), p. 156. 
46 Trondal and Veggeland, op. cit., p. 62. 
47 Ibid., pp. 63-4.   10
 
  After looking at the rules and regulations surrounding secondment, and a brief 
methodological explanation, I will look at the issues raised by the SNEs interviewed, both in 
their functions and their vision of secondment. 
 
Rules and regulations of secondment 
According to the relevant Council and Commission decisions regulating secondment, SNEs 
are there to “foster the exchange of professional experience and knowledge of European 
policies by temporarily assigning to the [General Secretariat of the Council or the 
Commission] experts from the member states’ administration.”
48  SNEs are therefore 
particularly important “in areas where such expertise is not readily available.”
49  As one 
Commission fonctionnaire told us, security policy as a field of competence has grown only 
recently, and the Commission “hasn’t been good at it.”
50  In this sense, the importance of 
SNEs in foreign policy-making at the European level is key to the development of knowledge 
and competence in these matters. 
 
  While SNEs remain in the service of their home employer and continue to be paid by 
it
51, they should “carry out [their] duties and shall behave solely with the interests of the GSC 
[Commission] in mind”, are responsible to their manager, and “shall accept no instructions 
from [their] employer or national government”
52.  As already said, this sort of “institutional 
schizophrenia” or “dual embeddedness” creates tensions that could be used to the benefit of 
both European institutions and member state governments.   
The length of secondment is two years, with possible extension up to a total of four 
years.  Also, there is a mandatory six-year “cooling-off” period between two secondments
53.  
As we shall see, SNEs interviewed believe this is ill adapted, since it prevents the 
development of European experience and of a culture of secondment, whereby civil servants 
                                                 
48 Council of the European Union, Council Decision concerning the rules applicable to national experts and 
military staff on secondment to the General Secretariat of the Council and Repealing the Decisions of 25 June 
1997 and 22 March 1999, Decision 2001/41/EC and Decision 2001/496/CFSP, Doc. n. 2003/479/EC, 16 June 
2003, OJ L 160/72 (hereafter Council Decision), whereas 2.  The language of the Commission decision is 
similar, see Commission of the European Communities, Commission Decision laying down rules on the 
secondment of national experts to the Commission, Brussels, C(2006)2033, 1 June 2006 (hereafter Commission 
Decision).  Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/job/sne/index_en.htm>. 
49 Council Decision and Commission Decision, whereas 1. 
50 Interview with fonctionnaire, Commission, DG Relex, Brussels, 4 April 2007. 
51 Art. 1-2, Council Decision and Commission Decision. 
52 Art. 5-1, Council Decision, and art. 7-1, Commission Decision. 
53 Art. 2-1, Council Decision, and art. 4-1, Commission Decision.   11
could rotate between capital- and Brussels- (institutions) based postings, creating a sense of 
mutual knowledge.   
Unlike trainees, who by statute perform the same tasks as administrators in the 
Commission, both decisions explain that SNEs are there to “assist” permanent staff
54.  
However, in practice, SNEs are considered full-time staff for the purposes of their work, and 
carry out the same functions as fonctionnaires. 
 
What is also interesting is what these statutes do not regulate.  For instance, while the 
deputy Secretary General of the Council establishes rules of recruitment for SNEs
55, there is 
no provision establishing a uniform application process at the national level.  While this 
makes sense so far as SNE applicants remain national civil servants, subject to national rules, 
this also prevents the development of a strategic approach to secondment.  In light of the 
benefits we will look at in the following sections, it would be wise to come up, at the member 
state or at the EU level, with rules that ensure that the best use is made of SNEs, both during 
their time in Brussels and after their return. 
Secondly, nothing in the statutes provides for training, once SNEs have arrived in 
Brussels.  This question has not gotten a clear answer amongst the SNEs interviewed, because 
some of them feel that “on the spot” learning is sufficient to acclimate oneself with EU policy 
processes. 
 
The regulations set out the conditions of secondment quite precisely: SNEs remain 
organically within their national bureaucracies, including on issues of promotion, but must be 
totally loyal to their new institutional setting during the time of their secondment. This was 
shown through a survey conducted by Jarle Trondal
56. This creates opportunities to use 
secondment to diffuse European foreign policy approaches to the national level, and 
reciprocally. 
 
Methodological issues 
For the purposes of this paper, besides a few permanent fonctionnaires, I interviewed five 
current and former seconded national experts, including a military officer.  All wished to 
remain anonymous, and work (or have worked) in the field of CFSP/ESDP.  Two of them 
                                                 
54 Art. 4-1, Council Decision, and art. 6-1, Commission Decision. 
55 Art. 1-3, Council Decision. 
56 Trondal, “Governing at the Frontier of the Commission,” p. 151.   12
worked in the Commission, and three in the Council Secretariat, including the European 
Union Military Staff (EUMS).  They represent a balance of countries and security traditions. 
 
  The questions asked to them were “marginal” ones.  The point here was not to ask 
them directly their role in European foreign policy, but rather, to see how they saw 
themselves in their “new” institutional setting, and how they viewed their position within the 
hierarchy compared to their colleagues.  In this sense, the discussion was kept quite open, to 
enable my interlocutors to reflect on their work, rather than answer a set of structured 
question.  Indeed, quite a few of them recognized that they had never thought of their role in 
such a way.  Interview time with SNEs varied between 45 minutes and an hour and a half. 
 
  In such a paper, I could only modestly endeavour to uncover some of the trends in the 
Europeanization of foreign policy.  Therefore, besides a larger call for comparative research 
in the role of individuals (SNEs, fonctionnaires, etc.) in CFSP/ESDP, I believe the agenda 
would benefit from studying the very specific role of SNEs on the field, especially in civilian 
crisis management
57. 
 
The Experience of SNEs 
Recruitment and application 
As has already been mentioned, each member state adopts its own recruitment procedure.  In 
the case of a Mediterranean member state, two people work fulltime in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs on promoting the presence of civil servants.  However, according to our 
discussions, this is a two-way street, since once the posting is published, there is a need to 
lobby to get more information on the job
58.  According to this SNE, the interest of the 
government in secondment is growing, but developing a strategic approach to the issue is of 
course more difficult for a small diplomatic service.  On the European side, however, the 
interviewee believes that the structure of the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) is 
complicated: too many people often work on the same issues, and there is no comprehensive 
questioning on “what is the added value of person X.”
59 
 
                                                 
57 This point was echoed by a fonctionnaire in the Council Secretariat, DGE.  Interview, 7 February 2007. 
58 Interview with SNE, DGE8, Council Secretariat, Brussels, 9 August 2007. 
59 Ibid.   13
According to an SNE from a large member state, who himself was never a national 
civil servant, but was nonetheless sent to the GSC by his government, there is a quick loss of 
institutional memory on the field.  In this sense, there is a strong need for people “in the 
know”.  At the same time, however, our discussant felt that the secondment system was not 
well promoted by the member states
60. 
 
An SNE from another large member state, working in the Commission, points out that 
her “[Ministry of Foreign Affairs] is a nightmare, administratively” when it comes to the 
application process
61.  Indeed, another SNE from the same country, who recently left the 
Commission, told us that, while it sometimes happens that an institution or a member state 
will want a specific person, or a specific nationality, to fill the post, most of the time it is 
incumbent upon the applicant to take the initiative
62.  While this might seem to be a case of 
what Lisbet Hooghe calls “self-selection”, in the eyes of this SNE, it isn’t necessarily “euro-
enthusiasts” who apply, and the motivations may be various
63.  Nonetheless, it does seem that 
the process is not an easy one, as pointed out in a survey of UK SNEs that says that “Many 
national experts find that they have to do much of the running in managing the 
secondment.”
64  This is, according to our interviewees, quite unfortunate, since secondment is 
a major commitment for a member state: there is a tremendous loss on return, since the 
government keeps paying a salary, while losing experienced staff for a two to four year 
rotation
65.  This is all the more reason for governments to ensure a comprehensive approach to 
secondment, so as to maximize the “return on investment” by easing the process on the 
potential SNE, thereby making secondment a normal part of a career track and ensuring that 
the experience gained will be used to its full potential once the SNE goes back to his/her 
home employer. 
 
A  fonctionnaire from the Council Secretariat did tell me that most of the time, 
nationality does not play any role in the selection process: the GSC often identifies a need, 
and selects SNEs on the basis of their expertise and policy strength
66.  However, it is also true, 
as a Commission civil servant said, that certain countries (such as France and the UK) are 
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good at using secondment: this is not to say it is a bad thing, since they gain a “unique insight 
into how we work”, and it is expected that active, or larger, member states want to exert 
influence and receive knowledge
67. 
 
Arrival and training 
A consensus emerged amongst our interviewees that, while formal training is at a minimum 
for newly-arrived SNEs, this is not necessarily a bad thing: besides offering some modules on 
inter-institutional decision-making, most of the learning should happen “on the job”.   
Furthermore, some things are not easily taught or learned: for our Mediterranean SNE, 
working in the GSC, one of the most difficult things to learn are the so-called national “red 
lines” that cannot be crossed when developing CFSP/ESDP instruments.  Indeed, an SNE has 
to learn to “work with 27 masters”, instead of one, when in the Council. 
 
Two fonctionnaires from the GSC said that, in their experience, an SNE either learns 
the procedures and processes, and accepts them as his own, or the expert refuses to learn, and 
applies his own (often national) rules, and in this case, fonctionnaires must constantly follow 
up and correct errors, resulting in waste of time and resources, and potential errors.  Given the 
institution’s strong administrative culture, in their words, an “SNE must adapt or fight”
68.  
While this doesn’t seem to be a widespread problem, it does indeed go against the general 
idea of this paper, that SNEs, by being open to European norms and rules of behaviour, 
spread these elements within their national administration. 
 
If seconded civil servants are sometimes at fault, however, it must be said that neither 
the home government nor the European institutions prepare the future SNE for the “culture 
shock” of Brussels
69.  While one Commission SNE took a three day training in policy 
processes at the inter-institutional level, the MFA offered no help, whether in terms of 
language training – an important element, given the requirements of the job –, of housing or 
other administrative help
70.  There is therefore a strong need, as recognized by the UK section 
of the SNE Liaison Committee (CLENAD), for advance training with the home employer, on 
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institutional processes and languages, as well as more help and training opportunities 
(technically not available to SNEs) from the institutions themselves
71.   
 
Work and integration in the unit 
This is the heart of the matter.  Indeed, if we are to accept that SNEs learn European patterns 
of behaviour and make them their own, we should try to find out what their work and 
integration into their unit mean.  Are these the reflection of the fact that they are “part of the 
team,” or do those variables signify that, because of their particular status, they are regarded 
“differently”?  The latter case would be a hindrance to any process of internalization, since 
there is no encouragement to assimilate within the environment.  As we shall see, this has not 
been the case. 
For our Southern SNE, day-to-day work in the institutions is more open than in a 
national administration; in that sense, it is “enlightening” working inside, even if the 
processes are also more difficult.  In her specific unit, there are few “experts” besides SNEs, 
especially since, given the functioning of the bureaucracy, and even if ESDP has evolved 
quickly, job positions have not changed much.  Nonetheless, the specificity of ESDP 
procedures means that, fonctionnaire or SNE, “you don’t stop studying”
 72. 
Our discussant felt fully integrated vis-à-vis the fonctionnaires, whether in team work, 
or in meetings, where she wasn’t regarded as somebody with a specific status.  The SNE also 
learned to “become more pragmatic” in terms of her thinking, and has come to recognize that 
some things can and cannot be done.  However, since career advancement is not at stake at 
the Council, she feels SNEs can be more proactive and speak more freely
73. 
 
Our Council interviewee from a large member state, who had already been employed 
by the Council on the field , believes it is absolutely necessary to have SNEs who have the 
appropriate expertise and knowledge, especially in security policy, since there is a lack of 
operational experience amongst fonctionnaires.  At the same time, ESDP is attractive as a 
career path, so self-selection is strong, in the sense that all those participating in it “want it to 
work.”  In this sense, there is a collective approach, a “socialization of the European interest”, 
and teams form no matter the specific status: people do not know, or care about, 
administrative differences between directorates or units, even if there might be a suspicion 
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(quickly forgotten), at the political level, that an SNE is trying to push a national position
74. 
As one SNE said, “We do not think according to nationality here. That is irrelevant. 
Nationality is only interesting over a cup of coffee.”
75 
 
In the Commission as well, SNEs are treated as full members of the team: while 
formally, they cannot speak on its behalf, they often must and do so, and are then recognized 
externally as agents of the Commission.  One national expert currently in the Commission’s 
CFSP Directorate also reiterates the point that SNEs can be more proactive than 
fonctionnaires, who, for career advancement reasons, must be minimalist, while seconded 
experts must make themselves visible and make the most of their secondment time.  In terms 
of thinking about foreign policy, this SNE believes she did develop different assumptions 
from those in the MFA, and that when she goes back, she will probably exercise those modes 
of thought
76. 
 
A former SNE in the Commission pointed out that, although technically, SNEs 
provide only advice and assistance, this is changing: our discussant represented the 
Commission in policy-making meetings and abroad.  In this sense, SNEs serve more and 
more as substitutes for fonctionnaires; not only does this mean that SNEs are fully integrated 
in the process, but at the same time, the Commission can learn from this as well
77.  In the end, 
what counts according to our discussant, is, on the one hand, whether or not the seconded 
civil servant has the correct mix of technical expertise, and grasp of historical national 
experience, that he can use at the Brussels level, and on the other, whether or not SNEs or 
colleagues are changed by experience.  Here, there is a need to “go with the flow”, and open 
up to the policy-making process, to understand that the potential is enormous
78. 
 
According to a Council fonctionnaire, and following what her colleagues said on 
training and procedures (cf. supra), SNEs exist along a continuum, with the two extremes 
being, at one end, those who consider themselves “policy advisers”, who believe they already 
know everything, which makes them difficult to monitor, and at the other, those who think of 
themselves only as technical experts, and must fit in.  The latter case is more useful for the 
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Council and most beneficial for both parties, as they are both willing to integrate and learn 
new information and capabilities, especially since there is a need both for topical knowledge 
(specific regional or functional expertise) and long term planning capabilities (development of 
instruments).  In the end, given their short time of stay, SNEs should seek to bring their own 
culture, but not necessarily to confront it with others, since the goal in the GSC is not 
consensus, but rather, to be informed of all national positions
79. 
 
Another permanent staffer of the Council, following the official regulations, told us 
that SNEs are in the Council Secretariat as technicians, not as diplomats or politicians.   
However, they cannot but help, through their expertise and experience, the GSC take care of 
subjects of interest to member states.  This, in turn, reinforces the trust of member states in the 
institution, and therefore, paradoxically, its independence.  At the same time, SNEs 
understand better how the GSC works, and can explain it when they go back to their home 
employer
80.   
SNEs on the field, for their part,
81 contribute heavily, according to the same 
fonctionnaire, to the development of an ESDP culture, because they create, from the ground 
up, new chains of command, new logistics mechanisms, etc.  Furthermore, the structure of 
operations itself is already very Europeanized, at the level of the concepts and values, so 
much so that there is a growing pool of talent and expertise, which wishes to go back 
regularly on missions
82. 
 
According to an official working in Javier Solana’s Policy Unit (a temporary agent, 
fully paid by Council), the detached agent quickly distances himself from his capital, and is 
no longer a “national pawn”, but yet still uses his information network.  In this sense, the 
agent works both for questions where his country has interests or strong opinions, and also, 
helps explain the workings of Brussels to a sometimes not so knowledgeable national 
bureaucracy
83. 
 
SNEs as lobbyists 
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Beyond team integration and behaviour learning, a second mechanism by which SNEs may 
diffuse European ideas on foreign policy is through “advocacy” during their secondment.  
This is a sensitive topic, since this happens on a totally informal and “off the record” basis, 
given the basic prohibitions on working for one’s home employer. 
 
According to the Mediterranean SNE, a diplomat has to keep good relationships, since 
it is part of the job, but there is a very clear understanding amongst colleagues at the GSC that 
the expert does not have any national “hidden agenda.”
 84  Furthermore, some info could not 
be shared by a national government with a fonctionnaire.  In the other direction, the 
discussant saw her role as a “facilitator” with her government for the Council, a mix of 
“teacher and advocate”.  In the last analysis, however, the SNE’s loyalty is very clear, and it 
is to the Council
85. 
 
The large member state SNE from the Council we spoke to reasserted the informality 
that has to surround any discussion with a member state government, but analyzed the process 
as a two-way game of mutual influence, especially in the case of the intergovernmental 
ESDP: it is a game, he claims, that “SNEs are well placed to play.”
 86.  The interviewee also 
described the job of SNE as that of unofficial “political commissar”, on the one hand, and 
advocate of the European position vis-à-vis his home country, on the other
87. 
 
One former Commission SNE told me that an expert’s contacts are a great value to 
one’s work in the Commission, since even they must work by consent within the decision-
making process.  This civil servant considers SNEs as the best advocates for their institutions 
vis-à-vis the national government: once the Commission starts spending money on issues of 
interest, “I was more influential, and there was a logic to my being there.”
 88  For example, at 
the time the Commission revamped its Rapid Reaction Mechanism into the Instrument for 
Stability, our interlocutor was the Commission’s point man to explain its use and value to his 
government
89. 
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While this aspect of the work of an SNE seems more topical than the social learning 
analyzed above, there is no doubt that lobbying, or advocacy, makes for a mutually beneficial 
relationship between the European and national levels, and in this sense, there is perhaps an 
openness to new ideas, approaches, and instruments of foreign policy. 
 
The case of military SNEs 
This is a specific case of secondment, which is why it is being analyzed separately.  Military 
SNEs work only in the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), which itself is only made up 
of SNEs, and have very specific tasks: their secondment is ruled by a specific statute (within 
the Council Decision on secondment), exemplified by the fact that their recruitment is directly 
drafted by the office of the Secretary General/High Representative
90.  Just like their civilian 
colleagues, military SNEs are still paid by their national armed forces
91, but work under the 
direct authority of the SG/HR
92.  Their secondment lasts a maximum of four years, with a 
three year cooling off period
93. 
 
According to an officer formerly seconded to the EUMS, the key issue within the Staff 
is that of integration of these diverse personnel, each with their strong national cultures and 
background
94.  This is confirmed by a recent article on the topic, based on a wide-ranging 
survey of military officers working in Brussels: what the military see as crucial is the unity 
and uniqueness of civilian-military command structures, because this is a translation of the 
(functional) global reach of the European Union’s external action
95.  At the same time, this 
integration also creates a “positive” challenge of bringing together different military cultures, 
and in this regard, feedback from returned SNEs is very good: the impact of these cultural 
clashes is actually appreciated by these officers
96.  The civilian-military framework also 
creates a new intellectual approach, since officers must adapt to this framework, but also to a 
multinational environment.  This global concept of crisis management is new and quite 
attractive to the military
97.  At the military staff, according to Bagayoko’s survey, citizenship 
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doesn’t matter, since professional cultures take over national cultures
98. However, there is still 
a certain unease, within the institutions, with “the military thing”: there is a misunderstanding, 
amongst civilians, of the specificities of the soldier’s work, which is “to die or to kill”, as well 
as of the importance of codes and symbols
99.  “It therefore appears necessary that the military 
be able to have their values recognized within the EU.”
100 
 
Expertise and technical knowledge are the most important added value of officers
101, 
since the EUMS is the “EU’s main source of military” knowledge
102.  But it is a particular 
type of expertise, given in very specific political and military conditions
103. 
 However, according to our discussant, the role of military secondees as lobbyists and 
advocates should play an important part in their work: in this sense, returned officers should 
try to improve ESDP at the national level
104.  This is what Bagayoko calls the
 “pedagogical 
function” of the military in the EU
105: one of their roles is to explain CFSP/ESDP processes to 
often reluctant army corps, whose ignorance is sometimes staggering
106.  Here, such 
initiatives as the European Security and Defence College, joint training and exercises are 
important, as they seek to create a “European culture of security in the ESDP”
107.  A majority 
of those interviewed by Bagayoko believe that ESDP institutions mean a transfer of power 
towards the GSC, so much so that “a certain number of officers … claim to wish to 
emancipate themselves from their state’s supervision and their desire to be at the service, if 
not of Community institutions, at least of institutions embodying the European interest.”
108  
The EU’s military organs seek to defend European dynamics, and in this sense wish that 
institutions worked more closely together
109. 
 
When on secondment, my discussant sees himself as a purely European officer, and 
believes this is the case for most.  Given the very open working methods and procedures in 
the Military Staff, there is an opportunity to develop a military culture through secondment, 
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and to work with civilians to create a civilian-military culture
110. In this sense, our SNE 
comes with an open mind, if not a blank slate, and sees this as an opportunity to develop his 
EU experience, and use it at his return.  He went on to say that the role of officers in the 
EUMS is to spread a European spirit, and the real task starts back at home.  He also pointed 
out that an officer’s formal education is strong on socialization, since one of the basic lessons 
of military academies is to learn to work in a staff
111.  In his opinion, the secondment of 
military personnel should be mandatory (and not only to the EUMS).  To sum up his thoughts, 
the military SNE I spoke to described his ideal case as a military officer who would come 
with a “blank page” to Brussels, to be filled with this new EU approach, and then disseminate 
it in his/her Ministry of Defence
112. 
 
In her third category of analysis (with expertise and pedagogues), Bagayoko analyzes 
officers as diplomats – when participating in Council Working Groups or informally sounding 
out member state delegations.  This presents three difficulties: this is a new function for 
military staff; they must negotiate both at the operational and political levels, since they must 
both create ESDP (a profoundly political task) and plan operations; in this sense, military 
SNEs are ideas-, rather than mission-, driven, which is not something the military usually 
does
113.  This means that, within the staff, there are constant informal negotiations, and this 
helps understand how “the military, like other categories of national civil servants, adapt to 
the models of behaviour produced by the European institutions.”
114 
 
  Those officers that Bagayoko met were, if not Eurosecptics, at least not enthusiastic 
about the project: once in Brussels, they quickly became Europhiles.  This is striking in itself 
for any category of civil servant.  This is even more surprising here, since the military is a 
very recent referent in a classically civilian Europe
115.  This is partly due, it seems, to formal 
military education, with its emphasis on teamwork and adaptability.  It may also be due to a 
certain sense of curiosity over this new instrument of European external action.  In any case, 
this does mean that slowly, European military officers are becoming socialized into a new 
environment, filled with new meanings and symbols, and that they are keen on spreading 
these norms throughout their national ministries. 
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Conclusions 
As in any European policy process, and even more so in the intergovernmental second pillar, 
European foreign policy is the result of a constant negotiation between national interests, 
European approaches, and individual preferences. In this context, institutional settings are 
important, as they are conducive to preference change and self-reflection on the part of agents 
working in these settings.  However, these processes of internalization are not so clear: if, as 
Liesbet Hooghe argues, Commission fonctionnaires do not seem to be socialized into a 
European way of thinking, then a fortiori, it cannot be argued that fonctionnaires in the 
Council Secretariat, or even SNEs, can internalize European norms, values, and patterns of 
behaviour. 
 
  From my discussions, it does appear that individual SNEs can play a role in bringing 
together various national approaches to foreign policy.  While their case cannot be 
generalized, national experts do bring two interesting things with them.  Firstly, by appearing 
totally loyal to their institution of secondment, they gain the trust of both sides (member states 
and the Union) and help the latter develop independently, within the confines of national “red 
lines” which are, amongst others, incarnated in SNEs.  Secondly, by integrating into teams, 
and gradually becoming full members of them, SNEs start to question their own thought 
processes, prejudices and assumptions about how to approach difficult concepts of security 
and politics.  All those I spoke to told me that they became more pragmatic with time, and 
that they further wished to bring that pragmatism back to their home employer.  This was 
particularly the case with military SNEs, who saw the ESDP as a new and exciting tool, one 
that they wished to understand better and disseminate amongst their colleagues “back home”. 
 
Given the importance, both for foreign policy identities and for the expertise and 
development of ESDP/CFSP, of secondment, there is a need, at the European and national 
levels, to address the issue in a more comprehensive and strategic way.  Member states invest 
a lot of resources (not least financially) into sending civil servants to Brussels, where they 
cannot themselves benefit from their knowledge, and yet, there does not seem to be a holistic 
idea of what member states want to do with secondees. 
 
  Member state governments and European institutions must therefore ensure that 
secondment become a normal part of a civil servant’s career development and professional 
track, including making sure that professional assessments, training and promotion   23
opportunities be open to SNEs.  Secondly, better support, both prior to secondment, during 
the stay in Brussels, and around the time of return, is necessary, to make the process as 
seemly as possible for civil servants, and avoid compounding the administrative culture shock 
with the burdens of practical life.  Finally, and related to the first point, at the time of return, 
home governments must take account of an SNE’s knowledge and experience (as developed 
in the institutions) when re-locating the civil servant to a national bureaucracy. 
  Secondment has been and is an important part of the development of CFSP/ESDP 
processes over the years, since security and defence are not issues that the Union has 
historically dealt with.  Secondees bring a wealth of information, knowledge and experience, 
and themselves are somewhat transformed by their time in Brussels, transformation which 
they seek to benefit from at the national level, entailing a slow convergence of national 
foreign policies and identities.  As member states think on the structuring of the future 
External Action Service (EAS), it may be time to think over the ways in which civil servants 
participate in European foreign policy making. 
 
 
 